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The prospects of China democratizing have garnered much interest and assessment. The 
increased interest is attributed to an increasing Chinese impact not only on the region, but 
globally as well. While China has experienced three decades of rapid economic growth, 
political reforms continue to lag behind economic reforms. With its legitimacy 
weakening progressively, a transition in political systems in the largest country in the 
world would have wide ranging implications in the political, economic and social 
spheres.  
Many have argued that economic growth is the main precursor to 
democratization. However, it is suggested, neither growth nor the resulting social 
phenomena are sufficient to bring about a democratic change in China. Drawing 
inferences from Taiwan and South Korea, this study seeks to examine the democratic 
transitions of both countries to shed light on China’s prospects for democratization. It 
further concludes that China’s prospects for democratization is bleak due to the resiliency 
of the regime, and any democratic transition would have to be elite-driven.  
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The prospects of China democratizing amidst three decades of rapid economic 
growth have garnered much interest and assessment. The increased interest is attributed 
to not only the size of the country, but also its burgeoning economy and population. 
China overtook Japan in 2010 as the world’s second largest economy. Its population of 
1.3 billion people is also the world’s largest population. These attributes translate to an 
increasing Chinese impact not only on the region, but globally as well.
1
  
Presently, the CCP continues to be resilient in maintaining its authoritarian rule in 
China. However, the country has been plagued by corruption, slow down in growth, 
social inequality, an aging population and decreasing competitiveness due to rising 
domestic costs. These factors severely threaten the CCP’s legitimacy that is built on 
economic growth and an all-inclusive society. Political reforms have continued to lag 
behind economic reforms. With its legitimacy weakening progressively, a transition in 
political systems in the largest country in the world would have wide ranging 
implications in the political, economic and social spheres. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION  
The thesis aims to assess the democratization prospects for China, taking into 
account current trends as well as the changes that have transpired economically, socially 
and politically, through a comparative analysis of the factors that have contributed to 
Taiwan’s and South Korea’s road to democracy. The factors that promote or impede 
democratization in China will also be examined critically. 
 
                                                 






China’s democratization prospects have been the subject of much analysis 
because of the potential implications at the international level. Based on Kant’s 
democratic peace theory, a democratic China would have a lower probability of going to 
war with another democracy.
2
 A democratic China would be manifested in more 
moderate foreign policies that would be less antagonistic in nature. This would also bode 
well for peaceful resolution of China’s maritime disputes in the East and South China 
Sea, and it could also translate to a peaceful reunification with Taiwan. As a democratic 
China is considered one of the main prerequisites for unification, it may result in less 
resistance from Taiwan. 
In terms of human rights issues, a democracy may also be expected to prevent 
human rights abuses and pursue a more measured approach to separatist ambitions in 
regions in the PRC such as Xinjiang and Tibet. A democratic China would also have a 
significant impact on totalitarian states such as North Korea, shaping Beijing’s diplomatic 
relations with Pyongyang and place China on the side of the international community in 
helping to arrest the volatile situation in North Korea. As a democracy, China would be 
expected to behave as a responsible power, being more open and accountable with regard 
to controversial issues such as the selling of arms and missile technology to rogue states 
and conservation of the environment. Hence, the resultant foreign policies would instill 
greater confidence in China among other countries. At the same time, there are potential 
downsides to China’s democratization. A democratic China may be more susceptible to 
domestic pressure, especially nationalistic sentiments that could have an adverse impact 
on its foreign policies as well.
3
 
                                                 
2 Russett, Bruce M. and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001), 114–24. 
3 Bruce Gilley, China’s Democratic Future: How it Will Happen and Where it Will Lead (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004), 227–30. 
 3 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Democratization is a complex process, regarding which few scholars can agree on 
the factors that cause or contribute to such a transition in the first place. Similarly, 
pegging a weight or importance to each of the factors is also seemingly impossible. 
While some factors strongly correlate with democratization, proving a causal relation 
remains challenging. It is also important to note that each country’s democratization 
process is unique because the conditions inherent in each country are distinct. To apply a 
single theory to gauge the prospects of democratization runs the risk of oversimplification 
and will result in incorrect assessments. Most theories also are explanatory rather than 
deterministic. Therefore, it is critical to examine the situation in China through the lenses 
of various theories to assess the prospects for democratization.
4
  
While China has experienced three decades of fast economic growth, political 
reforms continue to lag behind economic reforms. Many have argued that economic 
growth is the main precursor to democratization. However, it is suggested, neither growth 
nor the resulting social phenomena are sufficient to bring about a democratic change in 
China. Drawing inferences from Taiwan and South Korea, this thesis seeks to examine 
the democratic transitions of both countries to shed light on China’s prospects for 
democratization. It further concludes that the main driving factor would have to come 
through the top leadership. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The prospects of China democratizing have garnered many contentious 
assessments. While some scholars maintain that China may prove that authoritarian 
regimes can be flexible and resilient without democratizing, others believe that the 
economic reforms in China for the past three decades have propelled China in the 
direction of becoming a democracy, albeit gradually.  
                                                 
4 Carles Boix and Susan Carol Stokes, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 317–9. 
 4 
1. Factors Contributing to Democratization 
Among proponents of the argument that China is moving toward democratization, 
there is no agreement on which factors are the most significant. Advocates of 
modernization theory argue that economic development leads to democratization. 
Empirical studies often showed that democratization occurs when countries per capita 
GDP is approximately U.S. $5,000 to $6000.
5
 According to World Bank data, China has 
already reached that level since mid-2006.
6
 Hence, this meant that China’s economic 
conditions are ripe for democratization; however, the lack of progress for the past seven 
years is an indication that economic success alone is insufficient. 
The various factors arising from economic development such as the emergence of 
a middle class, higher educational levels, an increased standard of living, and 
urbanization have also been postulated as aiding democratization.
7
 However, others have 
countered that economic success lends legitimacy to the authoritarian regime and further 
entrenches it instead.
8
 Those who emphasize the emergence of a middle class as a factor 
in democratization point to the impact of increasing economic affluence in Taiwan and 
South Korea. Higher literacy rates and the shift in the social structure in each country 
produced a civil society that was more political conscious and that desired more political 
involvement, thereby triggering calls for democracy.
9
 
In comparison, the impact of the rise of the middle class in China has been 
controversial with studies contending that the situation in China is unique in that the 
middle class is usually a recipient of the benefits from the CCP. Consequently, scholars 
have also attempted to prove that despite China’s economic growth, public cry for 
                                                 
5 Kai He and Huiyun Feng, “A Path to Democracy: In Search of China’s Democratization Model,” 
Asian Perspective 32, no. 3 (2008): 148. 
6 The World Bank, accessed May 2, 2013, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx. 
7 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man; The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960), 
31–41. 
8 He and Feng, “A Path to Democracy,” 148. 
9 J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan and South Korea: Comparing East Asia’s Two “Third-Wave” 
Democracies,” Issues & Studies 43, no. 4 (Dec 2007): 246. 
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democracy has not increased correspondingly. Since the Tiananmen incident in 1989, 
demonstrations in China have largely been confined to isolated incidents or nationalistic 
sentiments instead of pro-democracy movements. The phenomenon is both a result of the 
crack down by the regime and the occupation with economic growth and the pursuit of 
financial success by the population. Therefore, those who justify based on the social 
mobilization theory that the working class or the middle class are the ones that campaign 
for democracy fail to take into account the tight control that the regime exerts over the 
population and the economic ties of the middle class to the ruling regime.
10
 
2. Leadership Factor 
The former authoritarian regimes of Taiwan and South Korea clamped down hard 
on dissidents and demonstrators since the 1940s sometimes culminating in extreme 
bloodshed such as the White Terror of the 1950s in Taiwan and the Kwangju crackdown 
in 1980 in South Korea. While social movements certainly exerted pressure on both 
governments, the democratic transitions were initiated more by the top leadership, 
Chiang Ching-kuo and Roh Tae-woo.
11
 
Taking a leaf from the Taiwan and South Korea examples, the leap towards 
democracy was triggered by decisions made by the top leadership in each country. 
Chiang Ching-kuo effectively orchestrated democratization in Taiwan when he allowed 
the opposition to form the DPP and contest in the 1986 elections although it was 
technically illegal do so. He subsequently ended martial law in July 1987, which restored 
rights to form political parties.
12
  
In South Korea, President Roh Tae-woo also chose to lean towards 
democratization, unlike his predecessor Chun Doo-hwan, who clamped down harshly on 
                                                 
10 Suisheng Zhao, China and Democracy: Reconsidering the Prospects for a Democratic China (New 
York: Routledge, 2000), 189. 
11 Jacobs, Taiwan and South Korea, 236–7. 
12 Ibid., 239. 
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protesters during the Kwangju uprising. As a result, political freedom, a free press, civil 
rights, and presidential elections were instituted.
13
 
In comparison, the leadership context in China is very different from that of 
Taiwan or South Korea. Strongman politics are unlikely due to the leadership structure in 
China. The current political structure in China emphasizes that the CCP general secretary 
is only the first among equals. On top of that, the current fifth generation leadership lacks 
the revolutionary credentials of previous generations. The CCP leadership’s consensus-
based decision making also prevents a single leader from dominating the political agenda. 
In view of this, decisions tend toward maintenance of the party’s interests, and reform 
initiatives toward democratization are muted. Increased institutionalization has also 
prevented factions from dominating through the balancing of powers between the 
different factions. Therefore, decisions are consensus based.14 
In regimes without the prestige that a cult of personality politician can command, 
an alternative may be that democratization results from fractional politics, whereby 
certain individuals resort to mass public support. As articulated previously, some scholars 
assess that conditions in society are not ready to support such calls for democratization, 
hence making such an avenue challenging.
15
 
While the leadership in Taiwan and South Korea had the political impetus to 
change to hold on to power, the CCP does not face similar pressure both internally and 
externally. Hence, it is postulated that democratization will require a gradual shift in 
values, which may take years to evolve. In the event that domestic pressure to 
democratize mounts and the risks of losing power increases, there is a possibility that the 
CCP as a whole may resort to more significant political liberalization to extend its grip on 
power, much like the KMT did in Taiwan. However, the current situation still sees a CCP 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 241. 
14 Young Nam Cho, “Elite Politics and the 17th Party Congress in China: Changing Norms Amid 
Continuing Questions,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 20, no. 2 (Jun 2008): 157–8. 
15 Yu Liu and Dingding Chen, “Why China Will Democratize,” Washington Quarterly 35, no. 1 (Jan 
2012): 55. 
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that is firmly in power. Hence, there is no clear impetus for the CCP to embark on 
democratization at the moment.
16
 
3. Internal Factors 
Confucian societies have typically been stereotyped as anti-democratic. Some 
argue that Confucian teachings are not conducive to democratization because of its 
emphasis on adhering to a hierarchical structure, recognition of one’s role in society, and 
its focus on that group rather than individuals and consensus over individuality. However, 
the experience of Taiwan and South Korea, both Confucian-based societies, refute this 
theory of cultural effects as an obstacle to democratization.
17
 
All three countries experienced rapid growth under an authoritarian government 
and have transited to an export-led economy. Coupled with high levels of education, 
increased social mobility and the rise of the middle class have been contended by many 
to be positively related to a democratic transition. 
4. External Factors 
External context is another factor that may promote or hinder democratization. 
Both Taiwan and South Korea democratized in part due to pressure from the United 
States. Since both were highly dependent on the United States for national security 
against external threats and monetary aid, there was pressure to accede to U.S. pressure to 
adopt democratic ideals in order for the continued support of the United States.
18
 China, 
however, does not face similar constraints. Hence, while it can be expected to want a 
better international standing, it is less constrained externally to conform.
19
  
It may be further argued that the close links between Taiwan and South Korea to 
the West and especially to the United States for trade, cultural exchanges and tourism 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “Democratizing China,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 38, no. 4–5 
(Oct 2003): 380. 
18 N. Eberstadt, “Taiwan and South Korea: The Democratization of Outlier States,” World Affairs 155, 
no. 2 (1992): 80. 
19 Hsieh, “Democratizing China,” 384. 
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contributed to the diffusion of ideas and values that promote democracy. With the boom 
in China’s trade, tourism, technology and media, the contact between China and the West 
is even closer in view of globalization. The advent of the Internet also aids in the spread 
of Western democratic ideals. Technology has enabled Chinese to compare the Western 
way of life with their own and promotes the merits of democracy as well.  
E. CURRENT STRATEGIES 
Looking back at China, the Tiananmen crisis in 1989 did not topple the CCP, 
instead the regime has continued to leverage on economic growth and an inclusive 
society strategy to boost its legitimacy. This was achieved through the cracking down on 
corruption, improving the pension and healthcare system, and increasing civil liberties 
and political reforms. Simultaneously, the CCP has also used cooptation of the working 
class and the capitalists to increase its political base. The multi-pronged approaches could 
explain why societal pressures have remained low.
20
 
In terms of political reforms, there are also dissenting views on how significant 
are the limited elections currently held at the local people’s congresses and village 
committees. The elections have been mainly limited to village committees, which some 
have argued is still being controlled by the CCP through the party secretaries. Instead of a 
meaningful attempt at democratizing, it is viewed as a token of appeasement by the CCP 
without any real intention of loosening control. However, others believed that these 
elections helped to expose the population to the concept of democracy, and are an 
essential first step towards increased political consciousness and liberalization.
21
 
The CCP has also used a combination of approaches to discourage calls for 
democracy. It has used Russia as an example to illustrate how political reforms could be 
detrimental to the growth and stability of the country, increased political participation of 
the people at the local levels, provide avenues for the population to redress their 
                                                 
20 Yang Yao, “A Chinese Way of Democratisation?” China: An International Journal 8, no. 2 (Sep 
2010): 332–4. 
21 Hsieh, “Democratizing China,” 379. 
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grievances through the Administrative Litigation Act of 1989 and the use of coercive 
methods as well.22  
Many scholars seemed to agree that the current social conditions in China is still 
not cohesive or strong enough to push for democratic reforms. With increasing economic 
reforms and also shifts in the social fabric of society, this may change gradually. Thus, 
far, the local population has been focused at the local levels instead of the central 
government at Beijing. As the nation progress, it is expected to see more calls for 
political reforms and democratization, but in the near term, the CCP continues to be 
resilient. Therefore, any transitions to democracy will have to be elite-driven. 
F. THESIS 
There remains much debate on the factors that will tip China towards 
democratization. The various economic, social and political changes also occupy 
different levels of significance depending on the argument made. This has led some to 
contend that China will continue to be as entrenched as ever while optimists believed that 
these changes are gradually moving towards democratizing albeit in a gradual manner. 
The thesis argues that while the various changes possess different significance, the 
leadership remains the most crucial factor for democratizing.  
Previous studies have not considered the differences between the fifth generation 
of CCP leadership with the old authoritarian regimes of Taiwan and South Korea. 
Therefore, the thesis will analyze the systematic differences between the authoritarian 
leadership of China, Taiwan and South Korea, and account for China’s prospects for 
democratization as a result of these differences. 
G. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
Asia’s “third wave” democracies in Taiwan and South Korea provide a good 
comparison to assess China democratization prospects due to the similar features that the 
three countries possess. Each country has experienced rapid economic growth, possesses 
                                                 
22 Andrew J. Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (2003): 13–5. 
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similar Confucian societies, largely homogenous populations and a military role in 
politics. Therefore, the similarities invite a comparative study of the democratization 
process in both Taiwan and South Korea and an assessment of their implications for 
China’s prospects for democratization. The examples of Taiwan and South Korea also 
illustrate the possibilities that authoritarianism can transit into successful democracies. 
The sources of the thesis will be based on scholarly articles that examined the 
democratization process in Taiwan and South Korea. Coupled with the comparative 
politics literature posing various theories on democratization, the thesis aims to highlight 
the conditions in China that mirror those in Taiwan and South Korea that will aid or 
impede democratization. In addition, the thesis will also take into account conditions that 
are unique to China and assess their implications for China’s democratization. 
H. SYNOPSIS 
The thesis will provide an overview of democratization in Asia and the 
implications of a democratic China on the world and Asia. In order to provide a 
reasonable benchmark to assess the prospects of democratization in China, it is essential 
to clarify democracy in the Chinese context. A discussion of liberal democracy and the 
levels of democracy in Taiwan and South Korea will also be included. Next, Taiwan and 
South Korea’s transition to democracy will be touched on to provide the reader an 
overview of the process. The prospects of democratization will include a discussion on 
the different democratization theories including modernization, social mobilization, 
cultural and negotiation pact theories. The examples of Taiwan and South Korea will be 
used to relate the conditions and factors to these theories to explain China’s prospects for 





The first wave of democratization took off in the nineteenth century starting with 
the United States and France. This soon spread to other countries, such as Great Britain, 
Switzerland, Italy, Argentina, Ireland and Iceland. Democratic institutions and norms 
slowly took shape including extending the right to vote to the majority of the population. 
The second wave started in the 1940s and lasted approximately twenty years. During this 
period, West Germany, Austria, Japan, Brazil, Turkey and Greece were democratized. 
The third tide of democratization resumed in the 1970s and swept thirty countries, 




This global phenomenon has sparked off substantial scholarly research because 
out of the vast number of change in government, less than half transited to democracies. 
Specifically, research by Freund and Jaud indicated that only 46 percent of regime 
transitions became democratic, 39 percent were unsuccessful and another 15 percent only 
shifted into democratic rule slowly.
24
 This difference in success rates has piqued 
scholars’ interest and spurred significant research into examining the process of 
democratization to find the underlying factors that leads countries to democratize. 
Methods have also evolved over time leading to an increasing use of statistics and 
modeling to analyze these factors. The proliferation of quantitative methods has not 
added to the conclusiveness of the arguments; instead, much contention continues to 
persist on the driving factors that cause countries to democratize. Various social, 
economic and cultural influences were assessed to be linked to the propensity of 
countries to democratize. Similarly, Samuel Huntington identified a list of factors that aid 
democratization such as increasing wealth, a strong middle class, more equitable income 
                                                 
23 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 16–23. 
24 Caroline Freund and Melise Jaud, “On the Determinants of Democratic Transitions,” Middle East 
Development Journal 5, no. 1 (Mar 2013): 1. 
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distribution, political leaders’ commitment to democracy, and countries’ prior colonial 
experience. The democratization hypothesis put forth thus far can be broadly categorized 




B. ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Advocates of the modernization theory argue that economic development leads to 
democratization. Seymour M. Lipset’s used the various indicators of economic 
development—that is, wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education levels in a 
country—to compare against its level of democracy. The results revealed that higher 
levels of these indicators are associated with higher levels of democracy.
26
 In his study of 
more than 100 countries from 1960 to 1995, Robert J. Barro similarly echoed Lipset’s 
view that affluent countries are more likely to be democratic.
27
 The third wave of 
democratic transitions that occurred in countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
showed off one similarity between these countries. All of them enjoy high economic 
growth prior to becoming a democracy. Hence, many scholars contend that the evidence 
supports the modernization theory that economic achievements contribute to 
democratization. 
On the contrary, Przeworski argued that the impact of economic development has 
been misinterpreted. Rather than modernization leading to democratization, he opined 
that wealthy democracies tend to be more sustainable while poor democracies are more 
fragile. Hence, economic development do not help countries to transition to democracies, 
it is only a relevant factor in maintaining the democracy once it has been achieved.
28
 
                                                 
25 Huntington, The Third Wave, 37. 
26 Lipset, Political Man, 31–2. 
27 Robert J. Barro, “Determinants of Democracy,” Journal of Political Economy 107, no. 6 (Dec 
1999): 166. 
28 Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics 49, 
no. 2 (Jan 1997): 166. 
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The theory has been criticized for being too simplistic. High correlation levels as 
shown in Lipset study do not necessarily imply that development causes democratization. 
Many scholars also cite numerous outliers such as non-democratic oil-rich countries to 
dispute the validity of the theory. The phenomenon is often explained as the ability of the 
dictator to buy the support of the population through proceeds generated from energy 
sales. Since the government pacifies the people, there is less accountability required of 
the regime. This usually results in regime stability and less calls for the government to be 
brought down. However, these kinds of stability can only be sustained as long as the 
regime continues to dish out benefits. When the resources become scarce or these 
benefits are reduced, the very source of stability will turn against the ruling elite.
29
 
In addition, the modernization theory fails to account why low-income countries 
such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal and Pakistan democratized during the 1980s and 




C. SOCIAL FACTORS 
Freund and Jaud statistical study supports the long-standing research by other 
scholars that the more urbanized a country is, the higher the possibility of it 
democratizing. It is assessed that an urban population possesses characteristics of 
individuals who are better educated and more conversant with technology. These people 
are also the ones who form the middle class in society, which proponents of the social 




The social mobilization theory emphasizes the need for the rise of a credible civil 
society and middle class to bring about democratic change. Proponents of this theory 
argue that as economic development brings more wealth to the population, this results in 
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the emergence of a middle class who is more affluent and well to do. With their basic 
needs fulfilled, the middle class aims to seek a more active role in the running of the 
country. This often leads to more calls for a political system that is more participative 
instead of authoritative. Moreover, this segment of society is also most apt at organizing 
itself on a common cause and initiate regime change. Some scholars also contend that the 
working class instead of the middle class is the ones that spur democratization.
32
 
Gender equality is another factor that is highly correlated with democratization. It 
is argued that societies that promote gender equality are usually those that respects 
citizens’ rights. Hence, this creates a more conducive environment for democratic 
transitions. In addition, gender equality also contributes to higher economic growth with 
the participation of females in the workforce. This in turns generates the economic 
condition that is frequently associated with democratization as well.
33
 
D. CULTURAL FACTORS 
Cultural theory purports to explain the impact of specific culture on the tendency 
for countries to democratize. Christianity, in particular Protestantism is believed to aid 
democratization while Islam, Buddhism and Confucianism are thought to be anti-
democratic. Christians advocate equality, which is consistent with democratic values, but 
the other religions tend to emphasize hierarchy, uniformity and respect for authority, 
which is considered antithetical to democracy.
34
 
Confucianism in particular has often been cited as an impediment to democracy. 
However, Fukuyama contends that Confucianism stresses the importance of education, 
which is the basic foundation of building a democracy. High literacy enables people to 
break out of the poverty trap. With a higher standard of living, people will also look to 
other non-material aspects to enhance quality of life including self-actualization needs 
such as political participation. High levels of education also allow the population to be 
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engaged in building democratic institutions. He further argues that though Confucianism 
emphasizes respect for authority, commitment to family relationships supersedes political 
authority. Moreover, Chinese society is inherently distrustful of authority and 
individual’s interests’ takes precedence. Therefore, it is rationalized that in such 
Confucian societies, it will be difficult to rally the people against a common cause.
35
 
E. EXOGENEOUS FACTORS 
While some scholars have focused on internal pre-conditions for democratization 
to take place, others highlight the significance of external conditions that contribute to 
democratization. A country that is situated in an environment whereby its neighbors are 
mainly democracies will be inclined to democratize for economic or political reasons. 
This is especially so if the democracies are prosperous, the people enjoy considerable 
freedom, and maintain a high standard of living. Alternatively, when one country 
democratizes, others are inspired to follow suit if democracy is perceived to be able to 
achieve the economic, social or political needs of the country. The success of one country 
in democratizing provides hope for another.
36
  
Although not all democratization has occurred in waves, Samuel Huntington 
identifies three distinct waves in which a tide of democratization swept through the 
various countries. During the first wave, from 1828 to 1926, countries that neighbored 
each other—such as United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, Ireland, and a number of 
European countries—democratized. In the second wave, from 1943 to 1962, countries in 
the same region, such as West Germany, Italy, Austria, Japan and Korea also transited 
into democracies. The third and most recent wave, from 1974 to the early 1990s, saw 
Greece, Portugal, Spain, India and Pakistan turning into democracies. Notwithstanding 
the fact that some of the democracies in the three waves either reverted or changed to 
authoritarian, autocratic or military rule subsequently, these waves demonstrate that 
democratic transitions in one country can have a contagion effect on other countries in 
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the region. Huntington postulated that one country’s democratization gives inspiration to 
the disgruntled citizens of another country. On top of that, these emulators from a 
neighboring state can observe how they should act and what pitfalls to avoid to initiate a 




Freund and Jaud similarly echo this regional effect on democratic transitions. 
Their statistical studies proved that this “neighborhood effect” is significant such that if 
there are any countries that tried to democratize within the past two years, other countries 
situated near it would also be more likely to undergo a democratic transition.
38
 
This diffusion of democratic ideals is further aided by the improvements in 
technology, communications and the advent of social media. Technology has invariably 
shortened the distances between countries and information gets transmitted also 
instantaneously. The ability to enforce information control and access is also increasingly 
difficult and costly, as the population gets more literate and savvy.
39
 
During the debt crisis in the 1980s, countries that were burdened with trade and 
budgets deficits were compelled to restructure and liberalize their financial sector to 
attract foreign direct investments. These changes aimed to increase investors’ confidence. 
As a result, such economic reforms were aligned with democratic institutions thereby 
setting the conditions for democratization to take place. As democracy, economic 




States that received massive foreign aid from democratic or communist countries 
also tend to face a certain level of pressure to adopt similar institutions so as to ensure 
continued aids from its patron. The aid enables rulers to buy off the loyalty of the elites, 
garner mass support by distributing to the population or to maintain security forces to 
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repress any uprising against the existing regime. Hence, the end of the Cold War saw a 
flourish of democratic transitions, was attributed in part to the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union. On top of that, United States provision of aid to Japan, Philippines, Taiwan and 
South Korea exerted pressure on these countries to democratize to varying degrees.
41
 
F. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP FACTOR 
Many scholars have supported the theory that while some external, economic and 
social conditions are found to aid democracy, people must be the main drivers 
democracy. Besides the rise of the middle or working class to spearhead democratic 
movements, political leadership is another crucial factor that can change the political 
destiny of the country. Huntington argued that leaders may choose the democracy path 




The type of leadership also determines the way democracy may be adopted. 
Barbara Geddes categorized the leadership as military, hegemonic party or personalistic. 
Geddes observed that authoritarian military regimes tend to be weaker and is most 
affected by poor economic performance. Military rulers usually opt to participate in 
democratic elections or return to the military; hence transitions tend to be based on 
meeting the terms of the people rather than through revolutions. Hegemonic party 
authoritarian regimes tend to survive the longest. When their power is threatened, 
hegemonic party regimes usually adopt incremental liberalization to extend their 
legitimacy. As a last resort, such regimes also tend to resort to manipulations of 
democratic elections to maintain their hold on power. Of the three types of regimes, 
personalistic regimes are usually the least likely to transit to democracies. Dictators have 
no incentives to democratize. Instead, they are faced with threats of persecution at the 
very least and assassinations at the other extreme when they lose their power. Hence, if 
democratization does take place, it is usually precipitated by violence. More often than 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 331. 
42 Huntington, The Third Wave, 107–8. 
 18 
not, the regime is replaced by yet another dictatorship instead of democracy. In such 
countries, democratization is highly unlikely to be spearheaded by the ruler himself.
43
 
Democratization driven by the ruling elite can be either be spearheaded by the 
dominant factions or occur due to a split in the leadership. It is not unfathomable for the 
dominant faction of the political elite to initiate regime change. The leaders may see a 
need for the country to adopt democratic institutions, either to prolong its dominance or 
for the general welfare of the population. For the former, political leaders would weigh 
the potential costs and rates of success of overcoming current economic problems, 
maintaining their legitimacy, strengthening repressive forces, deterring opposition, and 
restricting the population access to information. Where such costs are increasingly 
insurmountable or the leadership is confident of retaining its dominance after a 
democratic transition, the elite would drive the change. For the latter, the leaders could 
believe that becoming a democracy will improve well being of its citizens or it is a form 
of government that will invite international acceptance. Alternatively, a leader that 
possessed more liberal values and see the potential benefits for the country to liberalize 
could replace the existing one, resulting in a change of strategic direction.
44
 
On the other spectrum, splits within the existing leadership could manifest itself 
or be magnified over time. This could be due to differences in values, how the country is 
run, or how the political benefits are distributed. The opposition, being the weaker faction 
in this case can have the opportunity to initiate regime change if they garner sufficient 
support from the masses. By getting increasing popular support, it increases the costs for 
the dominant faction to continue to exert control over the people. Hence, when that 
happens, the dominant faction may choose to negotiate with the opposition in return for a 
slice of the pie after regime change or be overthrown altogether.  
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G. CONCLUSION 
Thus, far, the theories are categorized generally between internal and external 
conditions as well as elites versus the general population. It is presumptuous to assume 
that a single theory is sufficient to account for the myriad democratizations that have 
taken place since the nineteenth century. While identifying preconditions are important to 
gauge the probability of democratization, the underlying interplay between elites and the 
citizens should be factored into the equation as well. Many has argued that conditions 
itself does not lead to democratizations. Actions on the part of the ruling elite or the 
people have to be the driving factor as well. 
Empirical data have substantiated the relationship between different elements 
with democratization; however, interpretation of the relationship continues to be disputed 
by different scholars. Even though the statistical tests conducted may not be 
comprehensive, it has helped to identify some of the causal factors for democratization. 
However, it should be recognized that there are distinct differences in the 
democratization process. Therefore, any analysis should take into account these 
systematic differences and caution should be exercised to avoid broad-based theory that 
oversimplifies the process of democratization without taking into account the different 
underlying circumstances.  
As highlighted by Lipset, focusing on variables with a strong linkage to 
democracy to explain the causes of democratization fails to address the issue holistically. 
There are inherent unique conditions in each country’s transition that needs to be taken 
into account.
45
 There is no universal path to democratization that can be easily explained 
by a single theory.  
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III. TAIWAN CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
After being defeated by the Communists on the Mainland, Chiang Kai-shek 
retreated to Taiwan. Since 1949, the KMT exerted control over the island of Taiwan. 
Using the pretext of the revolution on the mainland, Chiang implemented martial law in 
Taiwan in 1949 as well. The democratic constitution that the KMT came up with was 
also never implemented, and the central government did not hold a single election until 
years after martial law was lifted in 1987. From the onset, KMT’s members from the 
mainland dominated the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan. 
Chiang controlled Taiwan with an iron fist and clamped down hard on political dissenters 
throughout his rule. The Taiwanese government was highly repressive and violent. 
Notably, the February 28, 1947, incident and the White Terror in the 1950s led to 
numerous executions and imprisonment. During the martial law period, it was assessed 
that a total of 140,000 were imprisoned while three to four thousand people were 
executed.
46
 Taiwan was a pseudo-democracy, for in reality it was being operated as an 
authoritarian state under Chiang Kai-shek. However, Chiang’s death in 1975 paved the 
way for the democratization of Taiwan through his son, Chiang Ching-kuo.
47
 
B. DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS 
Democratization did not take place immediately upon the elder Chiang’s death. 
Although Chiang Ching-kuo adopted a more liberal approach compared to his father, 
signs of democratization were slow in the 1970s and the authoritarian style of 
government persisted. The government was not any more tolerant of dissenters and 
continued to clamp down hard on them. Case in point was the December 1979 riot in 
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Several phenomenon in the 1970s and 1980s added pressure on Taiwan to 
democratize. In the 1970s, Taiwan started to face a legitimacy crisis when it was expelled 
from the United Nations in 1971. In view of the threat of Communism, the United States 
turned its interest towards China and reestablished diplomatic relations with the PRC in 




Taiwan’s booming economy especially in the 1980s also saw significant 
socioeconomic change such as growing industrialization, prosperity, wealth, rise of the 
middle class, and emergence of civil society. These changes resulted in various social 
movements that encompassed agriculture, religious, labor, environmental, women’s 
rights, consumer and student issues. At the same time, there was also an increasing 
opposition presence advocating democratic rule and independence.
50
 
In the midst of these massive changes, Chiang Ching-kuo was reelected as the 
president of the ROC in May 1978. In actual fact, it was akin to a hereditary succession. 
Despite the manner in which he took over the reins of power in Taiwan, he made a 
surprising public announcement in 1985 that precluded his position from being handed 
over to his son or to a military officer. On top of that, he transferred both his son and a 
potential contender, Wang Sheng, a prominent politician with military background, 
overseas to prevent an internal conflict from taking place due to his announcement.
51
 
Chiang Ching-kuo then embarked on moves to liberalize Taiwan by setting up a 
task force in April 1986 to look into avenues for political reforms.
52
 Subsequently, he 
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also started a series of dialogues with the opposition in May 1986 that culminated in a 
number of significant political reforms. He tacitly allowed the “Dangwai” opposition to 
form the DPP in September 1986, ended martial law in 1987, and allowed the DPP to 
participate in the December elections in the same year.
53
 Of note, he also reinstated 
freedom of speech, publication, assembly and association.
54
  
When Chiang died in January 1988, there was much controversy over the choice 
of successor. It was only six months later at the KMT’s Thirteenth Congress that Lee 
Teng-hui, a liberal, was appointed as the actual chairman of KMT, and reelected as the 
ROC president in March 1990. Although Lee’s position was challenged constantly within 
the party, he was able to consolidate his position effectively. Lee also continued the 
democratizing transformation and continued to co-opt the local Taiwanese, released 
political dissenters from prison, and negotiated with the opposition to gain their 
cooperation. To further facilitate democratization, he also implemented forced retirement 
of the mainland parliamentarians and allowed for the inaugural elections of the National 
Assembly and Legislative Yuan in 1991 and 1992, respectively.
55
 
Taiwan’s democratic transformation was marked by several breakthroughs. 
Firstly, Lee separated the military from the ruling party, abolished the Temporary 
Provisions Act, officially terminated the “Period of National Mobilization for 
Suppression of the Communist Rebellion” in 1990, and amended the constitution in 1992. 
Most significant of all was the first election since 1946 of the Legislative Yuan in 
December 1991 whereby the KMT won 70 percent of the votes while the DPP only 
managed to get 23 percent. The first ever competitive presidential election was also held 
on March 23, 1996, whereby Lee Teng-hui won by a huge margin over the DPP’s 
candidate.
56
 It was a watershed in Taiwan’s political history and marked the beginning of 
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Taiwan’s democratic politics.57 The democratization in Taiwan was considered to be 
relatively peaceful compared to South Korea. Several factors contributed to the transition. 
C. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO DEMOCRATIZATION 
1. Economic Factors 
Taiwan came under Japanese colonization in 1895 when the Qing Dynasty 
relinquished its control after being defeated in the Sino-Japanese War. The Taiwanese 
population suffered brutal repression under the Japanese for fifty years and only gained 
its independence in 1945, when Japan surrendered after World War II. Nonetheless, part 
of the legacy of the Japanese occupation did leave behind sound bureaucratic practices 
and sparked Taiwanese nationalism, both of which contributed to Taiwan’s economic 
expansion. During the postwar era, Taiwan was able to leverage on these aspects, which 
helped to develop a robust economy, maintain bureaucratic effectiveness and rally the 
people in building the nation, thus enabling it to prosper.
58
 
After the Japanese occupation, Taiwan gradually changed its economic strategy to 
export-oriented industrialization in the 1960s resulting in phenomenal economic growth. 
Urban areas started to sprout up and workers migrated from the rural areas to the cities in 
droves. While previously Taiwan was mainly agriculture based, its industries turned to 
manufacturing instead. The KMT-led government achieved years of sustained rapid 
economic growth since the 1950s. The GDP growth rate hit as high as 13.49 percent in 
1978. In 1952, per capita GDP was only US$158; however, by 1996, per capita GDP had 
increased by 85 times to US$13,428. The export-led economy also saw a huge jump in 
exports from US$2.26 billion in 1970 to US$151 billion in 1996.
59
 Taiwan is a shining 
success of a developmental state characterized by strong state intervention. The market 
continued to be capitalist in nature but there were extensive regulations and planning.
60
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The robust economic growth led to changes in the social fabric of the society on one 
hand, which was assessed to be conducive towards democratization. On the other hand, it 
also increased the KMT’s confidence in undertaking liberalizing moves. 
On top economic growth, an equitable income distribution also creates a 
population with fewer grievances against the government and hence promotes a smoother 
transition to a democratic order. The ratio between the income of the highest 20 percent 
of households and the lowest 20 percent was 4.97 in 1991, which was considered 
relatively well distributed compared to other developed countries like Sweden and 
Norway whose ration stands at 4.61 and 6.37, respectively.
61
 
2. Social Factors 
Even though KMT’s control of Taiwan was repressive in nature, the government 
promoted education. A census taken in 1966 showed that more than 97 percent of 
children attended primary school. There was also a distinct increase in the percentage of 
children that attended junior secondary school from 59 percent in 1966 to 95 percent in 
1977. The emphasis on education led to an increasingly educated population in the 1980s, 
which began to form the basis for the rise of the middle class.
62
  
Higher educational levels coupled with affluence also meant better access to 
information. These people are correspondingly better-informed and possessed better 
awareness of national and political issues. The socioeconomic changes have transformed 
the population to one that demands more participation in the running of the country.
63
 
Social ideals such as human rights, environmental consciousness, gender equality, 
universal suffrage and labor entitlements permeated the society.
64
  
Taiwanese immigrants since the 1970s also helped to garner international support 
for democratization and leverage on these support to apply pressure on the KMT. They 
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formed various organizations advocating for Taiwan’s independence including 
democracy with the WUFI being the most prominent organization in the United States. 
Their overseas activities include enhancing overseas Taiwanese political consciousness, 
aiding understanding of the Taiwan’s opposition fight for democracy overseas, and 
lobbying for support of their cause. As a result, there was international mobilization to 




Although Taiwan is considered a highly homogeneous society, there are striking 
ethnic and national identity cleavages. Chinese mainlanders controlled the ruling KMT as 
early as 1949. Even after Chiang Ching-kuo encouraged recruitment of native Taiwanese, 
the party continued to be dominated by the mainlanders. Furthermore, the gap in opinions 
was very much more pronounced when it came to national identity. While the natives 
favored independence, mainlanders advocated reunification with China. The opposition 
leveraged on the divisive identity issue to garner support from the people especially the 
natives. Hence, the push for democracy is arguably reinforced by the dissatisfaction of 
the natives for being ruled by the mainlander minorities.
66
 
Separately, Taiwan has had local elections since the 1950s but had never 
implemented elections at the central level. Direct elections in the provincial assembly 
were conducted in the 1970s, and regular supplementary elections for the National 
Assembly and Legislative Yuan were also instituted. These periodic local elections 
exposed the people at the various levels to the electoral process and the merits of 
participation. It also engendered the growth of opposition within the ranks of the political 




Although the opposition was insignificant in the beginning, it became more 
assertive in the 1980s as liberalization of the country got underway. The “Dangwai” 
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opposition was actively calling for democratization and even formed the DPP in 1986 
when martial law had yet to be lifted, and when they were run the risk of being 
persecuted. While not the main driving factor, the increasing daring opposition coupled 
with the rising social movements aligned towards a common goal of democratizing the 
country certainly added momentum to the transition.
68
 
3. Cultural Factors 
Taiwan is a largely Confucian society; however, globalization, commercial 
linkages, close relationships with the West, and increasing numbers of Taiwanese elites 
being educated overseas, especially in Japan and the United States exposed the people to 
Western ideals and thinking. This had the effect of diluting the traditional Confucian 
beliefs of the younger generations over the years. In turn, it has changed Taiwanese 
culture to a more liberalized outlook, which contributed to its democratization.
69
 
Furthermore, Sun Yat-sen’s three principles of nationalism, democracy and 
people’s welfare espoused democratic values. His ideas centered on creating an 
independent China with a strong sense of unity and identity to resist the imperialists’ 
coercion, he believed in the equality of men, and the responsibility of the state in taking 
care of its people. The principles formed the backbone of the KMT’s ideology. While 
impact on the ruling elites may differ; however, Sun’s revolutionary ideas inspired 




4. Exogenous Factors  
With the retreat to Taiwan in 1949, the ROC became even more dependent on the 
United States for external aid. U.S. arms sales were also an important avenue to build up 
its defense force. In addition, U.S. presence in the Asia Pacific region and security 
                                                 
68 Ibid., 166. 
69 Hsieh, “Democratizing China,” 384. 
70 Yu-long Ling, “Dr. Sun Yat-Sen’s Doctrine and Impact on the Modern World,” American Journal 
of Chinese Studies 19, no. 1 (Apr 2012): 2–7, 11. 
 28 
guarantees acts as a deterrent against any aggression by China. Incidents in the 1970s 
namely the Chung Li incident in 1977 and the Kaohsiung incident in 1979 shed unwanted 
limelight on Taiwan’s human rights abuses and the repressive techniques employed 
against dissidents. In view of Taiwan’s authoritarian style of government, poor human 
rights records of suppressing personal liberties and crushing of the opposition, the United 
States played a role in pressurizing the leadership to adopt democratic governance.
71
 
It was also in the 1970s that Taiwan progressively lost international recognition. 
The Cold War saw a shift in U.S. policies towards the PRC in order to curtail Soviet 
Union influence. In 1971, Henry Kissinger made a secret trip to Beijing in the hope of 
reestablishing communications. Japan was quick to catch on the winds of change, and in 
1972 established diplomatic relations with the PRC. In 1979, the United States 
normalized diplomatic relations with Beijing as well. As a result, Taiwan faced an 
increasing legitimacy crisis as the international community gradually leaned towards and 
accord recognition to the PRC. Under these circumstances, democratization would be an 
avenue to reclaim its status as an independent country.
72
 The KMT’s legitimacy was 
further threatened when Beijing began to emphasize reunification with Taiwan in 1979. 
The CCP proposed that Taiwan function independently as a special administrative region 
akin to the Hong Kong arrangement.
73
 
As Huntington argued, democratization in one country tends to have a contagion 
effect on other countries in the region. Taiwan’s democratic transition took place in the 
1980s when a third wave of democratization was sweeping through Asia involving the 
Philippines and South Korea as well. Regardless of the nature of the regime, transitions in 
nearby countries provided inspiration to the Taiwanese towards a more open political 
system. Furthermore, the experience allows one to emulate the other. The street protests 
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and rallies observed in the Philippines and South Korea was also seen in Taiwan during 
the same period. However, outcomes and timings may differ dependent on the economic, 
social and political conditions in the country involved.
74
 
Social media were not prevalent then in the 1980s. Nonetheless, Taiwanese had 
good access to the media with approximately 70.1 percent and 83.2 percent of the 
population who read the papers and watched television programs respectively. With 
political liberalization, media control by the government was also relaxed. This helped to 
expose the population to democratic ideas and increased their political consciousness. It 
also enabled comparison of the material benefits and liberties that citizens in democratic 
countries enjoy. This in turn propelled discontent among citizens in non-democratic 




5. Political Leadership Factors 
Democratization can be initiated by mass protests and demonstrations. Similarly, 
the ruling elites can choose to suppress it, condone it or go along with it. Hence, the role 
of the ruling elite cannot be understated when it comes to the timing and nature of an 
authoritarian state evolving into a democracy. Democratization is thus dependent on the 
power and will of the political masters as well.  
Chiang Ching-kuo was more receptive to loosening control than was his father, 
Chiang Kai-shek. After Chiang Ching-kuo took over as premier in 1972, supplementary 
elections were held consistently and involved more politicians that advocated a different 
view from the conservative ruling elites. In particular, more Taiwanese were also 
recruited into the KMT, infusing the party with more liberal views.
76
 
Even as the opposition outside the party was getting more vocal and demanded 
for increasing political reforms, the government was not in danger of losing control. 
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Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the KMT controlled the pace of the reforms. Even 
though suppression was an option, which the regime was well capable of, Chiang Ching-
kuo and later Lee Teng-hui, continuously implemented democratic reforms.
77
 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that in the initial period when he first took over as 
President, Chiang Ching-kuo continued to rule Taiwan akin to a dictator whereby he 
made all critical policies. However, it was also because of this same charisma and 
strongman tactics that he was able to enforce the political reforms subsequently, and 
successfully suppressed the conservatives’ opposition within the KMT.78  
Chiang Ching-kuo’s role in setting Taiwan’s course towards a democracy cannot 
be understated. He not only initiated political reforms, but also refrained from crushing 
the “Dangwai” opposition despite the formation of the DPP when it was illegal with 
martial law still in force. In an interview with the Washington Post, Chiang Ching-kuo 
also indicated his inclination to facilitate opposition parties. His actions not only rewrote 
Taiwan’s democratic destiny but also ensured a peaceful transition.79 It was also his 
conscious decision to prevent hereditary succession. Instead, he selected a liberal and a 
reformer, Lee Teng-hui as his vice-president who eventually succeeded him.
80
 While 
external factors as much as internal beliefs could be Chiang’s reason for choosing reform 
over repression, his role is without a doubt the driving force for democratization in 
Taiwan.  
Moreover, more than half of the politicians that made up the inaugural cabinet set 
up by Chiang Ching-kuo had studied overseas especially in the United States, United 
Kingdom and Japan. The exposure to the West no doubt infused some with a more liberal 
worldview. Out of the twenty personnel, only two possessed military education.
81
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progressive relaxation of control and support for democracy could also be reflective of 
the changing attitudes and views of the political elites. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The transition to democracy has been comparatively smooth for Taiwan. The 
country now practices free and fair elections and a multi-party system. As a result of the 
robust economic growth under the KMT’s stewardship in the 1970s to 1990s, Taiwan’s 
growing affluence, coupled with higher levels of education, urbanization and expansion 
of the middle class led to a society that demanded increasing social and political freedom.  
At the time of transition, while favorable socio-economic preconditions that aid 
democratization were present, there were also considerable external influences that 
further pushed the regime towards a democratic choice. However, the KMT was still a 
powerful force in the country with both the economic resources and coercive apparatus to 
keep the population in place. Hence, it was a deliberate and conscious decision by the 
ruling elites especially Chiang Ching-kuo to adopt political reforms and eventually 
democratize Taiwan. If Chiang had not initiated the changes, democratization might not 
have been as smooth for Taiwan or even took place in the 1990s at all. 
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IV. SOUTH KOREA CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION  
When the Japanese were defeated in 1945, Korea was finally liberated after thirty-
five years of brutal Japanese colonial rule. The Cold War rivalry subsequently split the 
peninsula at the 38th parallel in 1948, with the north being a communist state, and the 
south a democracy. Hence, South Korea started out as a liberal democracy as early as 
1948. Even though there were supposed to be a democratic constitution, nothing could be 
further from the truth. Instead of universal suffrage, political parties participating in free 
and fair elections, and freedom of press and media, South Korea was characterized by 
four decades of authoritarian rule whereby elections were often rigged, opposition parties 
were volatile, dissenters were harshly cracked down, press censorship was common, and 




B. DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS 
If Taiwan’s democratization process was relatively peaceful, South Korea’s 
transition was marked by multiple coups and violent demonstrations. Sunhyuk Kim 
argues that South Korea experienced three opportunities to democratize but only 
succeeded on the third try.
83
 
The first opportunity was in the late 1950s to the early 1960s whereby pro-
democracy students and opposition parties protested against the corrupt Syngman Rhee 
regime and advocated democracy and reunification of the peninsula. The student-led 
protests originated from Masan initially and expanded to many cities including Seoul. It 
ultimately culminated in bloodshed whereby 186 people died and 6,026 people were 
injured. This was termed as the “April Revolution.” Although this social movement 
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overthrew the Syngman Rhee’s regime, the optimism for a democratic beginning was 
short-lived when Park Chung-hee seized power through a military coup in 1961.
84
  
The second democratic junction occurred during the period of anti-Yusin 
movements from 1973 to 1980. These prodemocracy movements started when Park 
Chung-hee superseded the 1963 constitution with his Yusin constitution in October 1972 
under the guise of reforming the country. In actual fact, the new Yusin constitution was 
meant to justify his authoritarian stewardship. The prodemocracy movements led by 
students gained momentum despite arrests by the regime. Before any change could take 
place, Park Chung-hee was assassinated on October 26, 1979. Shortly after, Chun Doo-
hwan, an Army general staged a coup three months later in December 1979. Instead of 
instituting political reforms, Chun Doo-hwan suppressed the dissenters harshly 
culminating in the May 1980 Kwangju massacre in South Cholla Province. Chun Doo-
hwan was elected president by the rubber-stamp Electoral College. Democracy took a 
further step backwards when the Legislative Council for National Security subsequently 




As the saying goes that the third time’s the charm, this is indeed true in South 
Korea’s case. The third juncture in the mid-1980s resulted in a democratic breakthrough. 
Over the years, the prodemocracy movements gained in scale and momentum, involving 
a growing number of supporters. Three events galvanized the population further that 
brought about increased involvement beyond the usual students to include the middle and 
working class. The first event was when Chun Doo-hwan initiated the suppression of all 
talks on constitution revision, which generated a public outcry. The second event in May 
1987 was the attempted cover up of the death of a university student, who was tortured 
while undergoing police interrogation. The third event was the death of yet another 
university student by a tear gas bomb fragment in June 1987 during one of the street 
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protests. These events riled the population, and triggered mass mobilization against the 
authoritarian regime. The June 1987 protests involved approximately one million people 
across the country, and were on a scale never seen before in South Korea’s history.86 
In the three democratic junctures, civil society was a consistent factor in exerting 
tremendous pressure on the authoritarian regime; however, what was decidedly different 
was the role of the political elites, notably Roh Tae-woo, in transforming the political 
structure of the country. June 1987 was a critical point in South Korea’s history whereby 
it transitioned to a democracy and Roh was instrumental in putting forward the 
democratic policies. Several factors contributed to the transition. 
C. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO DEMOCRATIZATION 
1. Economic Factors 
Japan colonized Korea in 1910. It was not until the Japanese was defeated in 1945 
that Korea became independent. Similar to Taiwan, the Japanese style of occupation also 
imparted bureaucratic effectiveness and rising nationalism in South Korea, which 
contributed to subsequent economic growth.
87
  
After the Korean War, South Korea changed its economic strategy to focus on 
export-oriented industrialization instead of imports substitution. As a result of Park 
Chung-hee’s industrialization drive, South Korea experienced rapid economic growth. 
From 1961 to 1979, Seoul’s GDP growth averaged 8.3 percent with the highest growth of 
14.1 percent registered in 1969. In 1961, per capita GDP was only US$97, which was 
even lower than North Korea. However, by 1979, per capita GDP had ballooned to 
US$1,747. When South Korea democratized in 1987, per capita GDP had increased by 
thirty-five times since its 1961 level to US$3,368. The export-led economy also saw a 
                                                 
86 Ibid., 146–7. 
87 Jacobs, “Taiwan and South Korea,” 231–2. 
 36 
huge jump in exports from US$124 million in 1961 to US$53.6 billion in 1987.
88
 These 
economic achievements provided the necessary preconditions that advocates of the 
modernization theory argued are conducive to democratization. In addition, increased 
wealth also changed the societal makeup of South Korea.  
2. Social Factors 
Similar to Taiwan, South Korea’s income distribution is fairly good considering 
that the ratio between the income of the highest twenty percent of households and the 
lowest twenty percent was 5.70 in 1991. In comparison, other developed countries like 
Netherlands and France registered a ratio of 5.55 and 6.48, respectively.
89
 While this 
social phenomenon may mean fewer grievances against the regime as with the Taiwan’s 
case, South Korea’s demonstrations are remembered as particularly violent. This could be 
attributed to the colonization by Japan from 1910 until the end of World War II. Due to 
the Japanese colonial legacy and the harsh treatments inflicted on them, civil society in 
Korea was considerably aggressive against Japanese rule. Although the Japanese were 
able to suppress these opposition, Korean civil society was marked by fierce resistance. 
This hostility continued to be inherent in its society even after the Koreans were liberated 
from Japanese rule in 1945.
90
  
The South Korean government also promoted education after the Korean War. 
Where previously in 1966, more than 97 percent of children attended primary school, 
only 41 percent attended junior secondary school. However, by 1980, more than            
95 percent of the children have attended junior secondary school.
91
 The fast-paced 
economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s led to rapid urbanization and a shift from 
agriculture to manufacturing. The literacy rates also increased significantly as the country 
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 The improvement in socioeconomic conditions in South Korea also saw the 
rise of the middle class. With basic necessities issues out of the way for this group of 
people, they grew increasingly dissatisfied with the authoritarian regime and yearned for 
more political participation. Nevertheless, civil society was severely repressed prior to 
the 1980s as each leader from Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee to Chun Doo-hwan 
clamped down brutally on forces that threatened their position. 
When the authoritarian regime under Chun Doo-hwan relaxed its control in the 
1980s in a bid to increase its popularity, there was a marked increased in the formation of 
civil society groups. These civil groups and the opposition NKDP organized mass pro-
democracy movements in various South Korean cities such as Kwangju, Taegu and 
Masan. It was postulated that such mass rallies not only numbered more than 700,000 
people, participation also extended to different levels of society including students, 
workers, and religious leaders. In essence, there was widespread middle class support for 
pro-democratic movements. Compared to Taiwan’s protests, South Korea’s mass 
mobilization were often larger in scale and involved more bloodshed. This inevitably 
created more pressure on the government for political liberalization.
93
  
South Koreans has had limited exposure to elections even as early as the Japanese 
colonial times. Subsequently, local elections were abolished in South Korea in 1961.
94
 
Nonetheless, South Koreans are no strangers to the electoral process even if the central 
elections under the authoritarian regime are often rigged by the ruling elites. This 
exposure to democratic elections promotes the peoples’ understanding of democratic 
governance and the liberty to choose their leaders, which was always part of the demands 
brought up at mass rallies. 
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3. Exogenous Factors 
The threat of a belligerent North Korea featured prominently since the peninsula 
was divided into two states based on an imaginary line at the 38th parallel in 1953. 
Similar to Taiwan, South Korea is also highly dependent on the United States for external 
security against Pyongyang, and foreign aid to rebuild its economy. While previously the 
United States had been more focused on counteracting the communist threat, and hence 
propping up the authoritarian regimes in Seoul. Towards the end of the Cold War with 
the threat from the Soviet Union dying down, South Korea faced considerable pressure 
from the United States to democratize as a result of its brutal suppression of protesters 
and other human rights abuses. The explicit security guarantee by the United States also 
enabled South Korea to transform to a democratic system with a less probability of 
retaliation by North Korea. Furthermore, reunification of the peninsula has been the 
agenda for both the North and South. Therefore, democratization would lend more 
legitimacy to the government in South Korea among the developed nations and enabled 
the country to be accorded international recognition.
95
 
Notably, news of the fall of Ferdinand Marcos in Philippines in February 1986 
boosted the democratic movements in South Korea. The situation in the Philippines was 
quite similar to the South Korea in many ways. Both countries were under authoritarian 
rule for decades. There were widespread protests against the ruling regime. Likewise, 
rigging scandals often plagued South Korea’s presidential elections and the authoritarian 
leaders were repeatedly “voted” into power. In order to keep himself in power, Marcos 
called for an election and was accused by many of rigging the election to maintain his 
position. Hence, when hundreds of thousands of Filipinos and took to the streets and 
overthrew the Marcos regime, this success story inspired South Koreans from all walks of 
life to demonstrate against the Chun Doo-hwan regime.
96
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With South Korea poised to host the twenty-fourth Olympiads in 1988, the 
authoritarian regime was also under pressure to resolve the domestic crisis. Declaring 
martial law or violent suppression of the demonstrators ran the risks of the International 
Olympic Committee changing the venue of the Olympic games. Separately, the 
international community also threatened to boycott the games due to human rights abuses 
by the regime. Hence, the regime was hard-pressed to come to a resolution with the 
opposition as well to preserve its international standing.
97
 
Access to press reports and television broadcasts in the 1980s and 1990s kept 
South Koreans in the know of the socioeconomic and political conditions in other 
countries. Similar to the Taiwan’s example, these increased in exposure facilitates 
comparison and fuelled dissatisfaction. In the Philippines case, it also encouraged 
emulation to overthrow the regime. 
4. Political Leadership Factors 
Some scholars attribute the primary driver of South Korea’s democratization to 
mass demonstrations. However, they also overlook how the mass mobilization came 
about in the first place. While the Chun regime was highly repressive in the early 1980s, 
there was a change of tactics towards more tolerance from the late 1983. In order to 
increase the ruling DJP popularity, less control was exerted over political activities and 
dissenters. This was assessed to lead to the rise of social movements such as students and 
labor groups, and the growth of more credible opposition such as the NKDP. Without the 
liberalizing moves by the ruling elite, civil society would still be stifled. However, such 
moves worked against the ruling party contrary to their expectation.
98
 
Although the democratic transition was marked by major demonstrations in the 
country, negotiation between the ruling elites and the opposition led to a transformation 
to a more democratic order. While it was acknowledged that civil society was a 
formidable force in South Korea, the breakthrough would not have been achieved if the 
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ruling elites refused to budge. Even though there was no assurance that he will be able to 
remain in power or win during the next elections, Roh Tae-woo nonetheless agreed to 
democratic reforms, which was known as the “June 29 Declaration.” He could have 
dispatched repressive forces, implemented martial law and crushed the protesters as his 
predecessor Chun Doo-hwan had during the pro-democracy movements. Instead, he 
acceded to the protesters demands for liberalization and elections. Roh was only elected 
as the next president because the opposition failed to decide on a single candidate, 
causing support for the opposition to be split, thus enabling Roh to garner a higher 
percentage of votes than the two opposition candidates.
99
 
With five republics from 1948 to 1987, the South Korea’s political scene was 
characterized by multiple coups, volatility and domination by military strongman. From 
Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan to Roh Tae-woo, these presidents were known to 
operate like a dictator using force as their primary weapon. This could be observed based 
on the repressive tactics used on the opposition and dissenters. From 1948 to 1987, about 
six to seven hundred people were killed or executed, and slightly more than 100,000 
people were imprisoned for political crimes.
100
 It was also the very same domineering 
element that enabled Roh Tae-woo to overcome resistance within his own party and 
institute democratic change. To a lesser extent, Chun Doo-hwan also played a part in 
South Korea’s transition by accepting Roh’s proposal, without which the struggle against 
authoritarianism would have been more bloody and prolonged. 
In South Korea, more than half of the first Yushin cabinet had also studied 
overseas. Six out of the seventeen members possessed military education. The 
progressive infusion of party members with higher education and liberal ideas facilitated 
a shift in the mindset of the party.
101
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D. CONCLUSION 
As with Taiwan, South Korea belonged to the third wave of democratization and 
also the few democracies that had consolidated itself over the years while other countries 
have backslidden to authoritarianism. South Korea’s democratization took place as a 
result of liberalization moves in the early 1980s that was started by Chun Doo-hwan and 
the deliberate direction adopted by Roh Tae-woo to democratize. In view of the 
oppressive tactics that the authoritarian regime had been accustomed to, the actions by 
Chun and Roh were a departure from the past. Hence, it is argued to be an elite-led 
democratization. This is not to say that civil society does not have a part to play. Rather, 
the liberalization enabled the strengthening of civil society groups and the opposition, 
and weakened the state, thereby contributing to the democratization process.
102
 
Furthermore, civil society had been a consistent factor in all three democratic 
junctures. However, it was only during the third juncture that South Korea managed to 
democratize. While other factors are also in play that led to the democratization in 1987, 
the leadership factor was a prominent factor that facilitated the change.  
Since South Korea’s first democratic election in 1987, the country has 
experienced several peaceful transfer of power. Of significance, was when Kim Young-
sam became the first South Korea’s civilian president in February 1993, shaking off the 
military shadow of the past presidencies. This successful transfer of power over the years 
have shown that South Korea has shaken off its authoritarian past and further 
consolidated its democracy.  
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V. CHINA PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
China has transformed tremendously since Deng Xiaoping initiated economic 
reforms and his policy of “opening up” to the world in 1978. However, many scholars 
observe that the pace of political reforms continued to lag behind economic reforms. 
Nonetheless, even though China continues to operate as an authoritarian state, significant 
political reforms have been instituted since 1978. However, these political liberalizations 
have not led to democratization. Instead, China managed to achieve rapid economic 
growth without embracing democracy, akin to the many developmental states in Asia 
such as Taiwan and South Korea before their transition to a liberal democracy. 
It is not exactly true that China reject the idea of democracy. Many Chinese 
scholars have brought up democracy in their written works and widely discussed the 
merits of democracy such as Yu Keping’s “democracy is a good thing.”103 Similarly, 
Chinese political elites have highlighted democracy in their speeches, interviews and 
white papers. However, democracy is a concept that is defined differently in different 
contexts. The notion of democracy in China could differ from person to person, just as 
the Chinese concept of democracy differs from the West. Therefore, it is important to set 
the record straight when examining the prospects of China democratizing. The 
benchmark used is critical to assess the gap between the current situation and Beijing’s 
likelihood of becoming a democratic state. Moreover, democracy is a process that 
requires continuous enhancements and conscientious consolidation to build upon the 
democratic practices and institutions.  
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B. DEFINING DEMOCRACY 
Democracy originates from the Greek word demokratia, where it essentially 
translates to a system of rule by the people.
104
 However, such a definition is ambiguous at 
best and fails to provide a set of conditions of what it actually entails. As a result, 
democracy has taken on different interpretations by different people. Of significance, 
what democracy means in the West is very different from how the prevailing regime in 
China views it.  
China first published a white paper on democracy in 2005 titled “Building of 
Political Democracy in China.” Three themes stood out that encompass the crux of how 
the CCP defines democracy. Firstly it stated, “China’s democracy is a people’s 
democracy under the leadership of the CPC.”105 Secondly, the paper highlighted that 
“China’s democracy is a democracy in which the overwhelming majority of the people 
act as masters of state affairs…. In China, people enjoying the democratic rights include 
everyone who has not been deprived of political rights by law.”106 Thirdly, the paper also 
included a disclaimer that “criminal activities, such as sabotage of the socialist system, 
endangering state security and public security, infringement on citizens’ rights…are 
penalized according to law so as to safeguard the fundamental interests of the broad 
masses.”107  Hence, the CCP’s interpretation is unique in itself that label China as a 
“socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics.”108 One which is contingent on the 
CCP being the overarching authority, one in which the CCP defines and draws the limits 
of its citizens’ rights, and also one which stability and security of the state supersedes 
individuals’ rights. Indeed, if the CCP were known as a party state, this would mean that 
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the stability and security of the party is therefore paramount, above civil and political 
liberties.  
This unique stream of definition is in stark contrast to what most social scientists 
and human rights advocates would argue. Interestingly, China issued an update on human 
rights achievements for 2012 in which the paper highlighted that the country has 
advanced in terms of democracy and rule of law. The meaning of “masters of state 
affairs” was explained in the human rights white paper in which “democracy at the 
grassroots level is an effective form for people to be masters of the country.”109 This 
seemed to indicate that democracy in China will not extend to the central levels, and will 
continue to be out of the Chinese citizen’s sphere of influence. In addition, civil liberties, 
one of the measurements of democracy were articulated in the same white paper as 
“practical measures are taken to ensure citizens’ right to know and right to be heard. With 
the deepening of reform and the rapid development of information technology, the 
Chinese people’s scope of the right to know has been expanded, and so has the room for 
them to express their will.”110 This gives the regime much room for maneuver in deciding 
what constitutes citizens’ rights and what are considered practical. This Chinese 
definition represents the interpretation by the CCP. Therefore, in the regime’s eyes, the 
country is practicing a form of democratic governance.  
It is a fallacy to think that just because one calls itself a democracy, one is a 
democracy. Democracy varies in its extent of civil and political liberties, for the purpose 
of this study, democracy shall be defined in accordance with the modern Western 
concept. Robert Dahl defined democracy as a state whereby there are “elected officials, 
free, fair and frequent elections, freedom of expression, access to alternative sources of 
information, associational autonomy and inclusive citizenship.”111 These conditions are 
predicated on the rule of law such that personal rights and civil liberties can be 
adequately protected. These characteristics form the general view of what a liberal 
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 Hence, whether the state adopts a parliamentary or presidential 
system is immaterial. The current democracy in both Taiwan and South Korea also 
closely follows this definition. 
To bring about democratization in an authoritarian regime, Huntington observed 
that there are three avenues, namely, transformations, replacements and transplacements. 
Transformations are essentially elite-led democratization. Taiwan is a classic case of 
transformation where Chiang Ching-kuo spearheaded democratization. Elites opt to 
democratize for a variety reasons. Some assessed that the costs of repression has become 
too high to maintain and the lost of power is imminent. Some believed that democratizing 
would increase their legitimacy and maintain their hold on power. Other elites 
democratize with an altruistic belief that it will be beneficial for the country in the long 
run, or a combination of the above. Replacements are transitions in which the opposition 
in the regime grows powerful enough to overthrow the ruling elites even if they refused 
to relinquish power. Last but not least, transplacements is a process whereby the ruling 
and opposition factions in a regime compromise and initiate regime change such as the 
case of South Korea.
113
 
While the different types of transitions are distinct processes, democratization 
may sometimes evolve from one type to another and may not fall neatly into a single 
category. Case in point is South Korea’s democratization. While South Korea resembled 
a transplacement initially as the opposition and ruling party negotiate on mutual political 
changes, it could have potentially resulted in a replacement had Roh Tae-woo not set in 
motion significant constitutional changes. This was in many ways starkly different from 
the repressive approaches that marked previous authoritarian leaders like Park Chung-hee 




                                                 
112 He and Feng, “A Path to Democracy,” 141. 
113 Huntington, The Third Wave, 124–52. 
114 Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics, 68. 
 47 
C. LIBERALIZATION VS. DEMOCRACY 
Democratization involves liberalization; however, the latter should not be 
confused with the former. Liberalization entails the expansion of civil and political rights. 
A democratic state needs to possess the various characteristics listed by Robert Dahl as 
described in the preceding paragraph, which involves much more than the granting of 
individual rights.
115
 China has progressively loosened civil and political control since 
Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms in 1978. As a result, the Chinese population 
started to enjoy greater freedom, access to media, technology and material goods. 
Political participation has also increased, and formal channels to seek redress have also 
been made available. Nonetheless, various restrictions still abound in contemporary 
China, and Beijing is still far from being a liberal democracy. Liberalization provides an 
important signal on the direction of transition as it is considered a precursor to 
democratization. However, liberalizations may not always result in democratization if the 
regime’s interest is the primary motive since there will be impetus to liberalize but not 
necessarily democratize. Various dynamics come into play for democratization to take 




D. FACTORS THAT AFFECT DEMOCRATIZATION IN CHINA 
1. Economic Factors 
Taiwan and South Korea’s transition to democracy lends credence to the 
modernization theory that economic growth leads to democratization. Both Taiwan and 
South Korea’s transition took place at a time when both countries attained high levels of 
prosperity. According to Przeworski study, the tendency for a country to transit to a 
democracy occurs when the country’s GDP per capita is between $1,000 to $6,000, 
beyond which dictatorship tends to persist in the country. In yet another study, Fukuyama 
and Marwah justified that countries are most likely to democratize when GDP per capita 
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is between $5,000 to $6,000.
117
 When South Korea democratized in 1987, its GDP per 
capita was $3,244 while Taiwan transited to a democracy when its GDP per capita was 
$13,527.
118
 Based on both studies, Taiwan should have democratized much earlier in 
1988 instead of eight years later in 1996. In accordance with the same prediction, based 
on China’s 2013 GDP per capita of $5,511, it should most probably democratize around 
2014 to 2015.
119
 However, looking at the pace of political reforms in the country 
currently, democratization is not on the cards of the regime any time soon. Hence, while 
numerous studies have shown a high correlation between development and 
democratization, predicting when a country will democratize solely based on its levels of 
economic development is not a sufficient or accurate indicator.
120
 
Moreover, some argued that prosperity and economic growth could also sustain 
authoritarianism. Economic proceeds equipped the government with resources to 
distribute to the people. The higher standards of living associated with rising income 
levels also creates a satisfied population and imparts regime legitimacy. Similarly, in 
times of economic recession, the people could mobilize and overthrow the regime or the 
government could prevail by coming down hard on the protesters. The prospects of 
democratizing are therefore dependent on the tussle between the various forces.
121
  
Currently, China’s 2013 growth rate has stabilized at 7.7 percent. Although this is 
a marked decrease since its double-digit growth days, economists are lauding it as a 
healthy sign that China’s economic reforms may be gradually working, which is 
beneficial to the country in the long run. While optimists assessed that a growth in world 
trade will help China growth rates, pessimist opined that further growth reduction is 
expected if the economic reforms continue to prove to be effective. Regardless of the 
direction of China’s growth, affluence in itself is a double-edged sword. If growth 
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continues, it will impart legitimacy but give rise to social forces that may threaten to 
overrun the regime. If growth slows, the regime loses its legitimacy to rule. A holistic 




Besides examining per capita GDP, it is also important to look at income 
distribution. The economic opening brought about a rise in income and a higher standard 
of living, but this wealth is distributed disproportionately among the people. The disparity 
between the rich and the poor gets much publicity in social media. Although absolute 
earnings have risen, income inequality is increasingly evident in China. Based on the 
World Bank survey, the Gini coefficient that measures income equality showed a 
significant rise in inequality in China from 0.3 in 1998 to 0.43 in 2008. This was much 
higher than other countries in Asia while being on par with places like Nigeria and 
Russia. A high-income disparity increases the grievances of the marginalized section of 
society and could be potentially destabilizing.
123
 
2. Social Factors 
Increasing wealth in China has led to the inevitable rise of the Chinese middle 
class. Numerous studies have been conducted on how the growth of the middle class 
leads to democratization due to the citizens’ recognition of basic human rights such as 
freedom, justice, equality and political participation. Even as China envisaged that its 
middle class would make up half of the population by 2050, the current middle class is 
small by most standards, making up only 25 percent of the population. Compared to the 
middle class in Taiwan and South Korea, it is significantly lower. As a force for change, 
it is still lacking in mass. Moreover, Joseph Fewsmith opined that China’s middle class 
prioritizes standards of living and job prospects over political participation. Hence, it is 
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unlikely for the time being that the middle class in China will have the impetus to push 
for significant political change, unlike in South Korea in the 1980s. Furthermore, 
discontent over civil and political liberties does not mean that the middle class is calling 
for a regime change. Rather, with the CCP positive economic deliverables thus far, it 
could be a call to address the social inequalities.
124
 
Besides the role of the middle class, the population inclination towards 
democratic governance is also important. There is a dearth on comprehensive and up-to-
date research on Chinese citizens’ perception of democracy. One of the latest studies by 
Zhengxu Wang on China citizens’ views on democracy was based on a series of surveys 
conducted between 1992 and 2002. He concurred with Fewsmith that although the China 
population are receptive towards more democracy in the future, their priorities continued 
to be focused on economic growth and stability. There is a common impression among 
Chinese citizens that certain elements of democracy such as the presence of multiple 
political parties may affect political and social stability, thereby undermining economic 
development. Of particular interest, the general population is satisfied with the current 
regime’s rate of political liberalization towards democracy. This could be attributed to the 
political reforms instituted over the years including the implementation of grassroots 
level elections and rectification of governance issues such as rampant corruption and 
wastage within the CCP. On another note, even as the current population is contented 
with the social and economic conditions, the next generations are placing higher 
premiums on civil liberties such as political rights. While the push for democratic reforms 
may be slow now, the shift in mindset is nonetheless taking place slowly.
125
 
To empower the citizens, political liberalization at the local levels were 
promulgated as an experiment in 1988. Village elections have become a widespread 
feature in China where residents regularly elect their village committee. Direct elections 
have also been extended to townships and counties local people’s congresses. While 
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these initiatives were criticized for being plagued by corruption issues, lack of real 
competition, candidates being supported by party patronage, tight regime supervision, 
and the concentration of actual power within the party, scholars find it encouraging as 
this has exposed the population to the concept of democratic elections.
126
  
A pluralistic society conducive to democratization is dependent on the growth of 
civil society. Although civil society has flourished when Deng Xiaoping liberalized the 
personal domains and allowed for greater freedom, civil groups in China continues to be 
tightly regulated. Presently, NGOs require a government agency to sponsor prior to 
registering with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. All these meant NGOs are closely 
monitored, those that espouse liberal political values are prohibited by the regime, and 
illegal organizations are subjected to clampdown by the government. Even legal 
organizations are subjected to laborious administrative and supervision requirements, 
face extensive restrictions due to multiple laws and regulations governing NGOs, and 
regular inspections by the state are conducted to ensure strict compliance. Those found 
contravening the regulations are disbanded. Other methods to exert influence over the 
civil organizations include establishing close linkages of these NGOs to the government, 
co-optation of civil groups leaders, control the access to funding, and lastly through 
coercive means.
127
 Case in point is the Falungong, a religious group that practices 
meditation and espouses moral virtues. At its peak, the group consists of tens of millions 
of believers. But due to its sheer number of members and the way it operated independent 
of the state, Falungong has been viewed as a threat to the CCP, and hence extensively 
cracked down and outlawed in China.
128
 
In essence, social organizations are sparse in China. Where they do exist, they are 
allowed to grow in a way that does not threaten the regime, and usually lacks autonomy 
from the state. At the moment, the limited reach of these social organizations and close 
ties to the ruling CCP will not result in significant political changes that takes place from 
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a bottom-up approach. The social forces are currently weak and unable to support an 
opposition, even if there is one in the first place. 
In addition, to the various methods to curb civil society, the CCP also rely on its 
coercive apparatus to keep its citizens in place. For the year 2012, the CCP spent 
tremendous amount on internal security to the tune of $114 billion compared to the 
national defense budget of $109 billion.
129
 This was calculated to be an increase of 11.5 
percent compared to 2009. As society gets more complex and savvy with information 
technology, the costs of maintaining this repressive arm will be an increasing burden to 
the state. In the event of economic downturn, resources will be constrained, and it may 
reach a point whereby the regime may no longer keep up with the escalating costs.
130
 
The proliferation of the Internet also saw a tremendous surge in Internet users. 
Internet users in China were estimated to be as many as 618 million people by December 
2013.
131
 On top of that, virtual social networks such as Sina Weibo and Twitter have 
especially enabled the rapid spread of ideas and information both externally and 
internally. Due to the lack of formal channels to voice their frustrations, and the tight 
regulation of the media, the Chinese population has took to these informal channels to 
voice their discontent. The people who possess the technology know-how usually hail 
from the middle class, and are increasingly challenging the state control apparatus.
132
 
Over the years even as economic reforms requires greater information access, the 
government has not correspondingly relaxed media control. Censorship coordinated by 
the CPD has become all the more pervasive, blocking controversial websites and 
keywords. China ranked poorly in press freedom standing at 173 out of a total of 179 
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countries according to the 2013 press freedom index. Violators are often slapped with 
lawsuits, fines, jail terms and cessation of publications. Dissenters that advocate 
democracy or highlight the regime’s shortcomings were jailed most notably of which was 
Liu Xiaobo, a Nobel prize winner.
133
  
Official government documents such as the white paper released in 2010 
specifically states that: 
Internet security is a prerequisite for the sound development and effective 
utilization of the Internet. Internet security problems are pressing 
nowadays, and this has become a problem of common concern in all 
countries. China also faces severe Internet security threats. Effectively 
protecting Internet security is an important part of China’s Internet 
administration, and an indispensable requirement for protecting state 
security and the public interest.
134
 
The regime’s emphasis on state security clearly supersedes media freedom. The 
restriction on the Internet is also enforced in the name of public interest, under the CCP’s 
discretionary interpretation. Akin to the North Korean state, an effective tool of control is 
based on information restriction since some information promotes development of 
alternate views and independent thinking. However, Chinese citizens have found 
innovative ways to bypass the extensive censorship. The technically savvy population 
will increasingly challenge the feasibility of sustaining information control. In the long 
run, the regime may find it to be an unsustainable endeavor.
135
 
3. Cultural Factors 
Many associate Confucianism with authoritarian form of government as 
traditional Confucian values such as family over self, compliance to authority, strong 
collective ties, loyalty, consensus and hierarchism denotes certain subservient elements 
about society in general. This is not necessarily true. The other aspects of Confucian 
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values also emphasize good governance, political accountability, equality, tolerance, 
human rights, participation and meritocracy. Hence, Confucian values are not antithetical 
in a democratic system. What would make a Confucian society democratic does not need 
to depend on the morality of the ruling elites; rather, it is the adherence to the rule of law. 
Doh Chull Shin also opined that it is not impossible for a society to embrace both 
Confucian and democratic values. In which case, the democratization of Taiwan and 
South Korea proved that a Confucian society is not a hurdle for democratization.
136
 
4. Exogenous Factors 
China has grown strong economically and militarily. Even though its military 
capabilities still lag far behind the United States, it is fast becoming a regional power in 
its own right. Unlike Taiwan and South Korea, China is not dependent on any country for 
its security or economy. Hence, external influences hold little sway over China’s 
domestic issues. Case in point is the frequent international outcry against China’s human 
rights abuses against dissidents as well as towards its ethnic and religious minorities. 
Thus, far, such criticisms have not stopped China from harshly cracking down on 
dissidents and separatist movements. Furthermore, Beijing has consistently maintained 
that other states should not be involved in its domestic affairs.
137
  
Nevertheless, even if China is not susceptible to direct influences, it may be 
inclined to improve its international image and standing. In an increasingly globalized 
world with an intricate web of trade and financial linkages, China is progressively 
adopting internationally accepted institutions and norms. However, it has shown that 
China is able to progress economically without adopting corresponding level of political 
liberalization. Hence, it remains to be seen how far the regime is willing to go to sustain 
economic growth. 
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In the 1970s and 80s, Japan was the only liberal democracy in Asia. With the end 
of the Cold War, and the collapsed of the Soviet Union resulted in more democracies 
globally. Currently, Taiwan and South Korea has joined Japan as one of the consolidated 
democracies. Operating in this international environment will also lend much impetus to 
Beijing to adopt acceptable economic, social and political norms to enhance its 
international standing and legitimacy. Moreover, the spread of liberal values is even more 
pervasive than it was in the 1980s and 90s when Taiwan and South Korea democratized. 
China’s past history of humiliation by external powers has stirred up nationalism 
and fierce resistance against external interference, especially pressures to conform to a 
western standard. Anti-foreign nationalism can be leveraged upon by the ruling regime to 
bolster its legitimacy in the midst of its declining popularity. Nationalism also creates a 
sense of belonging and national identity and foster national integration.
138
 
With the highly publicized territorial disputes in East China Sea over the Senkaku 
islands by the media, China has to adopt a tough stance lest its population view it as weak 
and incapable. The intense anti-Japanese sentiments in recent times also resulted in 
demonstrations against Japan with the most recent case in September 2012 whereby 
protests erupted in 50 cities in China. It should be noted that the party seemed to give 
implicit approval via the People Daily, the CCP’s official newspaper. 139  Instead of 
coming down hard on the protesters, the regime adopted a sympathetic view and called 
these demonstrations as patriotic acts. This approach is adopted to enhance its popularity 
and also to ensure that public anger does not escalate to pro-democracy protests against 
the CCP. Furthermore, nationalism is a convenient conduit for the regime to use to 
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States are embodiment of democracy. Hence, the regime will be able to rally its people 




5. Political Leadership Factors 
The regime’s political leadership has adapted itself well over the years. Since the 
initiation of economic reforms, it has modified its progressively defunct Maoist ideology 
to one that is more all encompassing. In the early 1980s, the CCP focused on the role of 
the party in delivering economic growth, improving living conditions and satisfaction of 
the peoples’ material needs. This is a critical move to ensure the relevance of the party 
and sustain its legitimacy, which was supported by a robust economy. With increasing 
affluence and changing social demographics, the CCP developed a strategy to promote 
itself as an all-inclusive party for the people. Instead of purely a proletarian party, Jiang 
Zemin’s “three represents” co-opted the different strata of society to include the 
professionals, technical and entrepreneurial elites to broaden its party base. With 
widening income disparity and social ills that accompany rapid economic growth, Hu 
Jintao’s “harmonious society” subsequently aimed to address the social tensions within 




To relieve the pressure by the people for more political say, the party 
implemented elections at the local levels since the 1980s. However, some scholars argued 
that local elections at the villages, township and county people’s congresses were mere 
token gestures by the CCP to provide some form of controlled democracy, as the real 
power continues to lie with the party. There is also no meaningful opposition in these 
elections. The basis of conducting local elections was aimed at pacifying the rural  
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dwellers due to the failure of the commune system during the period of economic 
reforms. Hence, even if it is only restricted to the local levels, it was not the intention of 
the CCP to promote democracy in the first place.
142
 
Evidence continues to point towards the CCP tight grip on power. Even though 
village elections have been conducted for more than two decades, there are no intentions 
by the party to extend it to the central level. The intra-party democracy of the Politburo 
remains behind close doors, and do not take into account citizens’ participation. Hence, 
the token gesture for village elections is argued by some as pacification methods to grant 
some semblance of autonomy to the population. Other attempts at expanding elections 
such as the initiative to elect township governors were stopped.
143
 
Nevertheless, the CCP has been proactive in coping with the social problems that 
accompanied economic growth. The regime enacted several policies to improve welfare, 
improve accountability, enhance responsiveness, incorporate the peoples’ voice into 
decision-making, and stem corruption. To alleviate income inequality especially between 
the urban and rural dwellers, several policies introduced in the 2000s aimed to improve 
income distribution. Agricultural taxes were removed, farming subsidies and rural 
healthcare were introduced, school fees in rural areas were abolished, and minimum 
wages were also instituted. However, due to implementation efficiencies, the effects were 
not as pronounced as envisaged.
144
 
Other methods at pacifying the people involved providing the people with outlets 
to address their perceived injustices. The 1989 Administrative Litigation Act provided 
citizens with the avenue to sue the government for contravening its own policies. Andrew 
Nathan opined that these outlets direct the peoples’ anger towards the local government 
instead of the CCP. In addition, it also allows individuals to get redress instead of  
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resorting to civil organizations, which the CCP perceived as a bigger threat.
145
 On top of 




The anti-corruption drive has been an ongoing effort by the regime to revitalize its 
image. According to news reports, the drive has convicted almost 150,000 officials for 
corruption in the short span of five years since 2008.
147
 However, the scale of corruption 
in China is large and the extent to which corruption can be substantially controlled or 
continue to run rampant can be a force for democratization as well. In order to effectively 
curb corruption, media and judiciary liberalization is necessary, both elements of which 
contribute to democratization. Conversely, a half-hearted attempt at combating corruption 
would rouse further social discontent, and erode the regime’s hold on power.148 
To counter widespread discontent against pervasive corruption among party 
cadres, utilization and supervision of resources are now more tightly regulated and by 
different departments to prevent abuse of power. With the exposes on the wealth of 
prominent political elites, the CCP instituted measures that necessitate self-declaration of 
assets and avenues for the public to report corruption. However, these measures are still 
assessed to be lacking in transparency, as party members are only made accountable to 
party mechanisms and not to the judicial system. However, public backlash in recent 




Although some of the policies to relieve social problems have helped to relieve 
some pressure on the regime, social discontent is increasingly prevalent. The number of 
protests in China number around five hundred daily. Nonetheless, these demonstrations 
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mostly concern environmental, labor, social, religious and ethnic issues more than overt 
calls for democracy. Concurrently, there is also a rise in nationalism due to the maritime 
disputes over the Diaoyu islands. In a bid to distract the population from its social issues, 
the regime may increasing rely on these nationalistic sentiments to distract the population 
on its governance issues, bolster its legitimacy and increase its popularity.
150
 
Compared to the era when South Korea and Taiwan democratized, both countries 
had credible opposition in the government. On the other hand, China does not have any 
genuine opposition. The current eight non-Communist opposition parties in Beijing are a 
mere façade, and rely on the CCP’s patronage.151 Setting up of opposition parties in 
China is illegal and those who do so are frequently accused of subversion and harshly 
cracked down. Case in point was Cao Haibo who advocated for democracy and attempted 




E. ROLE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP ON CHINA DEMOCRATIZATION 
PROSPECTS 
The process of democratization is like a black box. It not possible to pinpoint a set 
of checklist in which democratization will take place if a tick is recorded for every 
condition. At the same time, the degrees in which conditions are fulfilled vary. In some 
cases, all it takes is a single factor to result for a tipping point to be reached. Georg 
Sorenson very aptly sums up that people are the crucial link in bringing about changes. 
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While it is true that there are important pre-conditions existing in Taiwan’s and 
South Korea’s societies as well as external influences; however, examining the transition 
process of both countries will show that the ruling elite spearheaded democratization in 
their countries. Even though there were alternatives that they could resort to, they 
embarked on a journey of political liberalization and eventual democratization. 
Democratization is a political process determined by human elements and not by 
structural preconditions.
154
 There are many examples whereby countries democratized 
even when certain preconditions deemed important by scholars are absent, and the 
reverse holds true as well. Hence, democratization can be a bottom-up or a top-down 
process. The analysis above shows that civil society is weak in China. Compared to South 
Korea, it does not possess the organized strength nor will to push for democratization. 
Hence, it is concluded that for democratization to take place in China, it has to be elite 
driven. Huntington similarly argued that democratization is a political choice undertaken 
by the political elites.
155
 
Political leadership is crucial in shaping the trajectory of democratization as 
shown in both the Taiwan and South Korea’s case studies. Hence, some scholars have 
argued that if Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader had facilitated the democratic 
movements in 1989 just as Chiang Ching-kuo had instead of using repressive techniques; 
China might have embarked on a very different path. To assess China democratization 
prospects, one must thus focus on the dynamics of elite politics as it shed light on the 
political decision-making process. In particular, the following section will also cover an 
evaluation of the fifth generation of leaders under the stewardship of Xi Jinping.
156
 
F. ANALYSIS OF ELITE POLITICS IN CHINA 
In the earlier years of PRC formation, personalistic leaders like Mao Zedong and 
Deng Xiaoping commanded immense political power with their domineering style. The 
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first and second-generation leaders could overruled decisions, purged their rivals and 
bulldoze over the oppositions. However, when Deng passed from the scene in 1997, it 
also marked the last of the charismatic leaders within the CCP. Where previously the 
prominent leader made the decisions, the CCP now conduct collective decision-making. 
Instead of power being concentrated in one person, it is now shared among a few. Young 
Nam Cho observed that policy-making during Jiang Zemin’s terms was consulted not 
only with the general secretary but also the premier of the State Council and chairman of 
the NPC. This change in trend is attributed to three factors. The generation of leaders 
after Deng were not involved in the struggle against the Nationalists; hence, they lack the 
revolutionary credentials in building the party. Secondly, Deng’s efforts in 
institutionalizing politics had also in the process created not only certainty in establishing 
terms and age limits but also instituted collective decision-making. It is no longer the 
one-man show that it once was. Thirdly, each political elite possesses substantial power 
and influence over his or her area of responsibility. All these meant that decision-making 
over the years became more consensuses based.
157
 
Instead of the preeminent leader of the past, even the general secretary can no 
longer wield power indiscriminately. As a “first among equals,” decisions often had to be 
made through negotiations with different power-holding groups within the party. Where 
the party leader was able to dictate his successor previously, as with the appointments of 
Liu Shaoqi, Hua Guofeng, Zhao Ziyang, Hu Yaobang and Jiang Zemin, this had not been 
the case for leaders after Deng. Occurrences that served to validate this included 
appointment of Xi Jinping to the post of general secretary although Li Keqiang was Hu 
Jintao’s succession choice. Similarly, Hu also did not managed to insert his protégés into 
the Politburo at will or managed to reduce the nine-member Politburo Standing 
Committee to seven. This translates to a new style of collective leadership aimed at 
safeguarding the majority interests.
158
 Hence, this makes implementation of radical 
reforms unlikely as any of the members could block another’s proposal. Rather, policy 
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approaches would veer towards moderate policies with the emphasis on protection of 
entrenched political interests due to the power-sharing dynamics within the party. Some 
scholars attribute this to the stagnancy of political reforms over the years.
159
 
Growing institutionalization in succession precludes turbulent power tussles 
among the different factions. While power seizures and purges marked previous 
leadership transfer, Deng’s time especially after 1987 saw a smooth transfer of power. 
Without the volatility of power transfers, regime tends to be more stable and there is less 
probability of a regime change.
160
 
G. POLITICS OF THE FIFTH GENERATION LEADERS 
The once a decade transfer of power to the fifth generation CCP’s political elites 
in November 2012 invoked a sense of optimism among the liberals that political reforms 
will gain momentum. Thus, far, the fifth generation leader Xi Jinping has consolidated 
his power, embarked on a highly publicized anti-corruption movement and push ahead 
with economic reforms. The Chinese public also viewed the handling of the Bo Xilai’s 
case positively and just, which has improved his popularity ratings considerably.
161
 
Selection of CCP leaders has also seen personnel with better educational 
backgrounds progressively. While previously the PSC leaders possessed revolutionary 
credentials, subsequent PSC members consist of more technocrats. Eight of the nine 
members in the 2002 PSC were technocrats.
162
 Within the fifth generation PSC members 
are two PhD holders namely Xi Jinping, the party secretary and Li Keqiang, the premier. 
It also saw for the first time numerous personnel educated in the humanities, which some 
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experts suggest could result in more emphasis on people-oriented policies. This could 
come in handy as China grapples with its rising social tensions.
163
 
Other observations within the party also reflect a growing emphasis on consensus-
based leadership. For one, the PSC was reduced to seven members during the 12th NPC 
held in March 2013 to facilitate collective decision-making. The practice of balancing 
blocs in the Politburo continues to be a feature in the Xi Jinping’s administration. This 
prevents any groups from dictating the policies. Instead, collective decision-making has 
been deeply entrenched since Deng’s time and continues to be the rule of the day.164 
The CCP is split into two different factions commonly known as the “elitist” and 
“populist” camps. Collective decision-making is facilitated by the even split between the 
two camps within the PSC among the fourth generation leaders. However, the current 
fifth generation leaders sees an uneven split with six members from the “elitist” camp 
under Xi Jinping prompting forecasts that party politics maybe dominated by the “elitist” 
faction. However, Cheng Li assessed that though the PSC is dominated by one camp, the 
Politburo, the Secretariat and the CMC still managed to achieve quite a good balance. 
Hence, decision-making can still be expected to be consensus-based.
165
 
New political elites infused with liberal ideas could also be an alternative avenue 
for leadership change to take place. These liberal views proliferate with increasing 
modernization and may come to dominate the political arena in the long run. While 
previous generation CCP leaders were educated in China, close to 20 percent of the fifth 
generation Politburo members were educated overseas such as Yang Jiechi, Li 
Hongzhong and Li Yuanchao.
166
 Some of the party members within the Politburo are also 
known to be more liberal-oriented. Notably, the ex-premier Wen Jiabao, Li Yuanchao 
                                                 
163 Raymond Li, “Six Politburo Standing Committee Members are Not Technocrats,” South China 
Morning Post, November 20, 2012, http://Www.Scmp.Com/News/China/Article/1086358/Six-Politburo-
Standing-Committee-Members-are-Not-Technocrats. 
164 Alice Miller, “The Work System of the Xi Jinping Leadership,” China Leadership Monitor no. 41 
(2013), http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM41AM.pdf. 
165 Li, “Rule of the Princelings.” 
166 Li, China’s Changing Political Landscape, 106. 
 64 
and Wang Yang are more receptive towards democracy. However, it is recognized that 




The fifth generation leadership also has more conservative elements than liberal 
ones especially since Vice President Li Yuanchao and Vice Prime Minister Wang Yang, 
both noted for advocating political liberalization were not selected for the prestigious 




While China’s new leader, Xi Jinping has worked fervently for economic reforms 
and to clamp down on corruption, the same cannot be said about political reforms. Xi 
Jinping internal memo, known as Document No. 9 brought up the danger on the Western 
concept of democracy, human rights, free press and social participation.
169
 Other 
specialists on China concurred that since Xi Jinping took over, his approach has took on a 
more conservative stance. The clamping down of corruption stemmed from the need to 
maintain party control, and the recognition that social outrage over corruption has on 
many occasions brought down regimes. Hence, scholars assessed that political reforms 




Hence, the analysis above has shown that the ball is now in the political elites 
court whether China will democratize. The middle class and opposition are not 
significant in producing the change based on the current situation. Hence, any prospects 
for democratization will need to be a top-down approach.  
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Reviewing the current situation in China sees a country characterized by poor 
civil liberties especially when it comes to religious and associational freedom and human 
rights. Political participation is severely limited and media censorship is ever more 
pervasive. Rule of law is weak in China, respect for private and property rights are 
lacking, and establishment for an independent judiciary is left wanting. Although China’s 
legal system has improved tremendously since the Maoist era, numerous new laws have 
been passed, and the pool of people with legal expertise has increased substantially. 




China’s democratic future continues to be bleak in the near future. However, with 
economic reforms and limited political liberalization, one can be sure that the CCP can 
no longer be stagnant and yet continue to hold on to power absolutely. The 
socioeconomic conditions have vastly transformed the Chinese society since China first 
opened its doors in the late 1970s. Political evolution will be a matter of inevitability. 
China is currently in a state whereby economic success is necessary to ensure the regime 
legitimacy. Previously some form of political liberalization was undertaken to facilitate 
economic reforms. Likewise, further economic reforms also necessitate increased 
political reforms to be effective. The regime perceived political reforms as a threat to 
regime survival; hence, it is foreseeable that the CCP may continue to delay political 
reforms, resorting to other means to pacify or repress the population. Until such time that 
the costs of exacting control is too great to overcome, will there be a possibility of 
significant political liberalization that may actually lead to democratization.   
In the event that liberals within the party gains more ground, political cleavages 
within the CCP can result in a split between the different factions. In the tussle for power, 
the more liberal side has a tendency to advocate policies contrary to the conservatives and 
attempt to garner societal support. When pressures on the regime starts to mount, the 
conservative faction may be forced to negotiate for increased political reforms that 
inevitable leads to democratization in the future. China specialists highlighted the 
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Tiananmen incident as an example whereby factional conflicts resulted in political 
upheavals, which could potentially change the course of the country’s political path.172 
Separately, economic or social crisis may compel political elites to negotiate. Even 
isolated incidents such as corruption scandals can severely erode the regime’s legitimacy 
and incite social discontent. 
Many social scientists today argued that democratization is a process, and the 
United States and United Kingdom democracies have achieved the openness of today 
through a protracted journey lasting about two centuries.
173
 Considering that China only 
started opening its door to the outside world in 1978, the unfavorable judgment leveled 
on its dismal democratic progress may have been too critical. 
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